As a civil society organization dedicated to developing the political culture and civic activism, at the very core of CRTA’s mission and all our efforts lies a tireless fight for advancing democracy in Serbia. Through “Undermining Democracy”, we wanted to take a deeper look at the decade behind us, recognize the crucial moments that shaped, or are to this day shaping the reality we live in, and, as much as possible, offer a roadmap for strengthening democratic institutions and forces in our society.
As a civil society organization dedicated to developing the political culture and civic activism, at the very core of CRTA’s mission and all our efforts lies a tireless fight for advancing democracy in Serbia. Through “Undermining Democracy”, we wanted to take a deeper look at the decade behind us, recognize the crucial moments that shaped, or are to this day shaping the reality we live in, and, as much as possible, offer a roadmap for strengthening democratic institutions and forces in our society.
At the same time, this was an opportunity to engage more actively with academic scholars, with whom we share our dedication to facts, collecting and verifying relevant data, critical thinking about our surroundings, and interpreting events that direct socio-political developments.
“Undermining Democracy” is the result of a two-year long research, and our intention to answer several questions: what is happening to democracy in Serbia, how has the previous decade altered its various aspects, and how can we fix it? Searching for these answers is not easy, and usually not optimistic either, but it is necessary if we genuinely want to leave in a better and more just society.
We owe a debt of gratitude to the authors whose articles explain and lead readers through key points of democratic processes in Serbia; to our reviewers, who significantly contributed to the quality and the precision of this publication. Additionally, this is an opportunity to thank the Embassy of the Kingdom of Netherlands for their support and cooperation throughout the years.
The fight for democracy needs to be permanent, which we can see through challenges faced by societies at a much higher level of democratic culture development than in Serbia. I hope that this publication will be a tool in the hands that are protecting democracy in our society, and that it will serve as a reminder to never take our rights and freedoms for granted, but to pursue them every day, and defend them without compromise.
Despite the continued encouragement of a wide and dense network of international democratization promoters in Serbia, domestic political elites seem to have learned over time to skillfully exploit the structural weaknesses of development aid for their own political interests. The instrumental and ambivalent attitude of the authorities towards the reforms demanded from abroad resulted in the partial adoption of democratic norms in society. The progress of reforms (especially the unpopular ones) was often perceived by citizens as mere fulfillment of external conditions for material gain. Although without international assistance, domestic "supply and demand" for democracy would undoubtedly be weaker than it is today, the extent to which the quality of the democratic process in Serbia has remained dependent on whether and how external actors intervene suggests that the way international incentives were realized encouraged and undermined the foundations of democratic consolidation at the same time.
There are inherent tensions between the EU demands for the speedy resolution of open post-conflict issues, on the one hand, and the continuation of democratic reforms, on the other. These enable the ruling elites to remove (with tacit (dis)consent of European institutions) important actors of the democratic process from the political dialogue. Furthermore, the technocratic nature and focus of the negotiation process on the executive allows non-democratic practices to survive in all aspects of political life. All this, in a system with a predominant party, inevitably facilitates the seizure of institutions, media and civil society in party/clientelistic webs of relations.
Bypassing and violating democratic procedures by the authorities in Serbia for the sake of the realization of international political and economic transactions is an increasingly common practice. Agreed at the level of political leaders and hidden from the public eye, many economic agreements concluded by Serbia undermined the principles of legal certainty, transparency and democratic governance. Although the so-called "corrosive capital" is proverbially linked to non-democratic countries and is considered a key channel for their "malignant" influence in Serbia, non-transparent business has also marked economic agreements Serbia made with actors from Western democracies and international financial institutions.
The current growth, as claimed by the soft powers of global actors with non-liberal regimes, is also reflected in the dynamics of political processes in the entire Western Balkans. Not only do domestic political elites find support and legitimacy in non-liberal regimes for their own actions, but citizens also recognize in them alternatives to the current liberal order to which they are bound by betrayed expectations. Although democracy in Serbia at least declaratively remains "the only game in the city", the growing sympathy that political representatives and citizens have for non-liberal actors and practices warns that the democratic model of governance in Serbia will remain burdened with numerous shortcomings in the future.
The open issues that Serbia has with its neighbors represent an inexhaustible source of raising tensions. This often serves to divert attention from internal democratic deficits and civil discontent. Any sharpening of rhetoric towards the neighbors not only resulted in incendiary nationalist outbursts of political representatives, but was often used to deal with "internal enemies". Anyone who opposed the discourse of national vulnerability or criticized the government on any grounds would soon be labeled a traitor and collaborationist, either by officials or by media loyal to the regime.
In the observed period, there is a significant marginal upward mobility, i.e. to a general increase in the number of jobs, within which the number of jobs for professionals, entrepreneurs and skilled workers has been particularly increased. However, this did not bring about a reduction in inequality. On the contrary, an increase it brought upon an increase of inequality compared to previous years, because these new jobs were not created with an equal (or at least proportional) chance to members of different social classes. The possibilities of moving up the social ladder are increasingly unequal. Those who are descendants of the members of the upper class have disproportionately better chances of climbing the ladder, than those belonging to the lower class. This leads to further growth of class inequalities and makes the transformation of Serbian society unfair.
Since the beginning of the democratic transition, support for the values of democracy has been gradually declining. The difference between the social classes in that support has been increasing. Members of the ruling class, experts and (less and less) small entrepreneurs, all of whom are “winners” of the post-socialist transition, give greater declarative support to democratic values than other social groups, noting that the values of small entrepreneurs are getting closer to the "losing" coalition.
A significant part of the expert social group also expressed its pro-democratic political position through civil revolt, street protests and increased activism in the civil sector. Nonetheless, in order to achieve any significant political goal, they need an alliance with other social groups. The analysis of civic activism of different social classes in Serbia shows trends that do not create much space for creating a joint social action of members of the presented classes. Just the same, there is a visible spark of a class alliance that has a potential for spreading. It consists of a combination of the orientation towards democratic values and civic activism (carried mostly by the social group consisting of experts), a part of the social group of clerks and technicians and a smaller part of the working class.
In the period from 2009 to 2012, key laws were passed for the functioning of citizens' associations, which facilitated their registration, project financing and enabled the free establishment of endowments, foundations and funds. Volunteering is being introduced into the Serbian legal system for the first time. After the adoption of key status laws in this area, there is an expansion of the civil sector - as many as two thirds of civil society organizations in Serbia were established after 2010, i.e. after the adoption of the Law on Associations.
Civil society in Serbia operates in an increasingly unfavorable environment, especially after 2014. The state policy of controlling, conditioning and imposing the interests of the ruling party shapes the space for civil society to act. Direct attacks by the authorities on civil society activists involved in information, democratization, advocacy, human rights and transitional justice became more intense and direct during this period. Financial controls, arrests, defamations and accusations against activists in the state media are some of the increasingly frequent mechanisms for dealing with critical and state-independent voices.
After the election in 2014, the already limited possibilities of the influence of civil society on decision-making are further reduced. Ministries or parliamentary committees rarely organize public debates and hearings, and even when they do, invitations are sent to selected organizations or too late for adequate preparation and constructive participation, and comments and recommendations are ignored. Cooperation between the civil sector and the state is most often reduced to budget financing of CSO activities, which further contributes to a more cooperative approach of these organizations to the state.
As most citizens' associations are financed from public sources, the activities of civil society are significantly directed towards and dependent on the state. In recent years, it has become noticeable that only those associations that publicly support the government or at least do not threaten / criticize it in any way can count on budget funds intended for civil society. The government and the ruling parties are increasingly establishing loyal citizens' associations (GONGO and PONGO). These organizations serve to create the illusion of democracy, support the authorities and invalidate critical voices.
The process of using media institutions as political instruments, the abuse of public money intended for the media, as well as the media organizations themselves, intensified after 2014. The Regulatory Body for Electronic Media (REM), through a series of controversial elections of members of the Council, put itself at the service of politicians. This resulted in it becoming an ineffective actor who does not fulfill its competencies. Consequently, two public media services, whose boards are elected by REM, have lost their independence and editorial autonomy. Measures aimed at encouraging media pluralism, state advertising and non-transparent allocation of public money are increasingly rewarding the media that report uncritically on the authorities. Contrary to media laws, the state remained the owner of one part of the media, and became an active participant in the market of cable distribution.
Rating: NEGATIVE
Since 2014, journalists' associations have been recording increasing pressure on journalists and media workers. These pressures mainly come from the political sphere. In addition to the most dangerous type of pressure (physical attacks), organized campaigns of discrediting journalists on social networks and tabloid media are also used. Administrative harassment (tax inspections, etc.), denying access to events and information of public importance are another part of that long list. Journalist protection mechanisms are underdeveloped and inefficient, despite the establishment of a Permanent Working Group on the Safety of Journalists in 2016. These pressures and obstacles, together with a relatively underdeveloped professional culture, have led to increased self-censorship among journalists.
With the increasingly intense and comprehensive captivity of the media, internal media pluralism is being lost. Citizens can find different points of view in the abundance of offers, but individual news media do not provide them with access to a variety of voices, positions and perspectives. This is especially true for political information. The space for exchanging opinions and confronting views is all but gone, which leads the media to uniform and one-sided reporting. Especially worrying is the fact that there is a lack of pluralism on the two public media services, as well as on televisions that have been granted a license to broadcast programs country-wide.
In the last decade, there has been a significant increase in the use of the Internet among citizens. The openness of digital communication enables many social actors to communicate their messages, and citizens to get acquainted with more diverse information. The Internet has provided a platform for investigative and fact-checking newsrooms, as well as for local media. However, the digital public sphere follows the framework of political and media polarization, not offering spaces for dialogue. Also, the internet has brought new opportunities for pressure, intimidation, spreading hate speech and fake news. Especially in the field of political information, it enabled covert influences on public opinion through organized false accounts that support the government and attack those who question it and try to hold it politically responsible.
The last decade has been marked by an increase in women's participation in politics in general, government institutions in particular - primarily legislative, and after the last elections in 2020, the executive. Unfortunately, the real influence of women on policies and processes of social development is still inadequate. Women in positions of power generally reach these positions following the usual clientelistic patterns of political loyalty, promoting political agendas established by their party's political leaders, and failing to impose fundamental changes in patterns of power and political cultures.
Gender equality policies were not effectively implemented. The focus was only on certain areas, such as combating violence against women. Although some positive developments were noted in a slight increase in the value of the gender equality index, what is lacking is the transformational power of policies that would contribute to fundamental gender change power and consequently gender roles and inequalities in the positions of women and men.
Weaker participation of women in government and weaker influence on policies are partly a consequence of fundamental structural inequalities. They are a product of long-lasting historical processes and manifested through a lower rate of property ownership by women, lower economic participation, less economic power in the form of starting a business or running a business. They also have a limited access to technology and are more represented in those areas of the labor market that are characterized by lower employment opportunities and lower wages, primarily in the social services, personal services and trade sectors. This includes investing own resources in taking care of the household and the family. In the past 10 years, there has been no significant change in the situation, nor any introduction of policies that could change the situation in the future.
Viewed individually, the most dramatic setback was noted in the area of freedom of expression. Despite the developed institutional and legal framework that guarantees rights in this area, a decade behind us has seen a decline in the quality of public dialogue on all important and less important social issues. This decline is reflected in the growing intolerance towards dissidents, the established practice of delegitimizing and slandering interlocutors with whom the authorities do not agree, and the "pollution" of public space that leads to political passivation of citizens.
Progress has been made on freedom of peaceful assembly, especially regarding the LGBT population. From a period of violence and bans on organizing gatherings, Serbia, thanks to the actions of the authorities, has reached a phase of tolerance and relative public disinterest. Similarly, the government showed tolerance for political protests, even when they were not held in accordance with the law (that is, when they were not reported) and when they lasted for months. On the other hand, the government's strategy to provoke violence during the 2020 pandemic protests shows possible steps in the direction of restricting freedom of assembly. This could also be a strategy for hijacking social institutions and processes seen in other spheres, and thus making them devoid of purpose.
The situation in the area of access to public services is complex and uneven. It is characterized by unequal access of the lower social class to health and education services and a quiet bifurcation and privatization of the system (especially in health care). This could potentially lead to an "outflow" of the middle class towards private providers. If this trend continues, the public service system could be in jeopardy.
Limited progress has been made on the right to a fair trial. The Law on the Protection of the Right to Trial and the Law on Free Legal Aid were adopted, but their implementation has brought limited progress. The average trial length has been reduced, which lead to trial costs being reduced. The changes have therefore limited effects, but are still positive.
Since the 2014 elections, the coalition centered around the SNS has won about 50% of the vote. This party is in power at all levels, with the exception of a few smaller municipalities in Serbia. This concentration of power adversely affects democracy because there are no effective control and monitoring mechanisms. These mechanisms would allow the ruling party to remain within the legal framework, but also to be accountable to its voters. The dominance of the SNS is reflected not only in the favor of the voters, but also in the resources and finances that are available to them. This is a direct consequence of the amendments to the law on the financing of political parties, which further strengthens the unequal position of the parties, and makes their election struggle less equal.
The atomization and fragmentation of opposition parties has been going on since the 2012 elections. The fragmentation of opposition parties and division along different lines (ideological and tactical), but also the personal intolerance of leaders makes it impossible for the opposition to perform its functions of control and supervision of the government. There are no alternative policies proposed either, and that would at least formally create an alternative to the current government. Without these functions performed by the opposition, there is no democratic society, especially when it becomes a long-term feature of the party system. Atomization can also be seen in numerous small parties that gather around the SNS. Another example is the constant decrease in support for the SPS coalition, which brings it closer to other opposition parties in terms of strength.
Political parties in Serbia have never been fully ideologically profiled; however, during the first and second decades of party pluralism, the lines of political division, as well as the most important topics, were more noticeable. With the rise of the SNS and their taking the position of an all-encompassing party, the ideological differentiation of the parties has significantly decreased. Almost all parties have a reduced clarity of views on specific issues. Moreover, it is common for the members of the SNS party to hold completely contradictory views, especially when comparing their messages for the domestic and international public. At the same time, opposition parties’ main agenda is simply challenging the regime. They do not pay attention to ideological consistency of their views. This situation makes it difficult for voters to comprehend the political field and make politicians accountable for their promises.
An additional consequence of ideological inconsistency is the increasing importance of party presidents for the functioning of said parties. This is most apparent in the case of SNS. The president of this party is also the President of the state. This is not the only example of presidentialization of the party, but after the SPS under Milosevic, the SNS is the only party that depends to that extent on the popularity of the president. Presidentialization is not limited to the relationship with voters (although such would have a significant negative impact on political representation), but also on the dynamics of the government and parliament - it is obvious that all important decisions are made by President Vučić, and that ministers and MPs consult and rely on the President.
The parliament has never fully realized its potential influence in the political system. The growing trends of presidentialization and centralization of power in the hands of the executive, especially in the post 2014 period, have greatly contributed to further disruption of the separation and balance of power. That resulted in the degradation of parliament, with continuous, indirect pressure on the parliament to act as dictated by the ruling party. The simulation of parliamentary mechanisms and processes has led to the distortion of the role of parliament.
We note a trend of reduced use of the urgent procedure for the adoption of laws. This is emphasized especially when viewing all laws adopted in parliament together, including ratifications of international agreements, which are most often adopted by regular procedure. However, the urgent procedure is still used to a very large extent for the adoption of new laws and amendments to existing ones. Frequent and unjustified use of the urgent procedure in passing laws contributes to the adoption of deficient legal solutions. This reduces the quality of the legislative process and thus the quality of life of citizens. The quality of the legislative process is also diminished by scheduling committee and plenary sessions in short time-frames, as well as omitting laws and other acts proposed by opposition and minority MPs from the parliamentary agenda.
The trend of collapsing parliamentary control and monitoring of the executive power has been noticeable since 2014. The control mechanisms are used less and less, and there is a formalistic approach to their use, which makes the process more difficult. There is also a noticeable lack of transparency regarding the work and achievements of control mechanisms, especially survey committees and commissions. Parliamentary control mechanisms have been reduced to superficially filling out forms. Their essential purpose became maintaining the semblance of functional parliamentary supervision, promoting the ruling regime, and defying the opposition and non-parliamentary actors in society.
There is noticeably less space for pluralism of opinion and dialogue, as well as for the effective involvement of civil society and citizens in the work of the parliament. Bypassing and violating the rules, procedures and mechanisms, as well as preventing the participation of the opposition in the work of the plenum, all done by the parliamentary majority, culminated in a boycott of the parliament by the opposition in 2019.
A slight change in the direction of greater formal compliance with internal procedures and provisions of the Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly was noted in 2020. This was due to pressure from the domestic and international public. However, substantial progress is still lacking in the proactive use of procedures and mechanisms that would contribute to the effective work of parliament in practice. The pronounced dominance of unanimity in the parliamentary plenum was visibly accentuated after the elections held in 2020, with the formation of a new de facto one-party parliamentary convocation. Only 7 of the current 250 MPs do not belong to the ruling majority.
The trend of worsening of the atmosphere in the plenum due to the inappropriate behavior of MPs especially contributed to the degradation of the reputation of the parliament. The absence of sanctions for the abuse of the parliamentary rostrum and the unacceptable behavior of the MPs is obvious. Their rhetoric is often marked by elements of hate speech and attacks on representatives of the opposition, the media, the judiciary, civil society and others. Even though the Code of Ethics was adopted in late 2020, no improvement is visible.
The formal rules governing the conduct of elections have not changed much, and when this has been the case, they have been changed in the direction of harmonization with international standards. The electoral system has a satisfactory level of proportionality, while deviations are largely the product of votes for lists that did not surpass the electoral threshold. Negative development is noticeable only in 2020, when the election rules change before the very beginning of the elections.
After 2014, in the second phase, there is a noticeable decline in the quality of the election process. However, the weaknesses of the process were present even earlier. The key factor that enabled the disintegration of the election process is the passivation of the election administration, as well as the regulatory and control bodies. The absence of the controlling role of independent institutions, along with a politically biased election administration, in a media environment that has already favored the government, has created conditions for the unhindered domination of the ruling parties. Their advantage is also realized through the abuse of public resources, negative media campaigns against political opponents and the development of clientelistic relations with voters.
Two negative trends in voter turnout are obvious: de-partying of electoral lists and decrease of voter turnout. Restrictive conditions for the registration of political parties, together with a rigid electoral system and a pronounced dominance of the ruling parties, led to an increase in the number of coalitions and groups of citizens, to the detriment of independent lists of political parties. There is also a noticeable trend of declining voter turnout, from extremely high at the beginning of the period (almost 70%), to a turnout of less than half in later stages.
While the elections were very competitive at the beginning of the period, the ruling parties are gaining an increasing advantage. In the final phase the elections lose their competitive character and no longer enable the presentation of opposing political options in society, nor challenge the government through elections. The dominance of the ruling party has become more pronounced since 2014, when no opposition list won more than 10% of the seats, and the trend of disappearing pluralism from the main representative body culminates in 2020, when the opposition is almost non-existent in parliament.
In terms of voter representation, the trends are mostly positive, which primarily refers to those aspects that are directly affected by the electoral system, such as the representation of women and representatives of national minorities. In addition, there is a surprisingly stable geographical proportionality of elected representatives, and better representation of the younger generations, especially in the 2020 elections.
In the last decade, there has been a worsening of election conditions. The multi-party system collapsed, and the political system is distorted. This trend peaked after the 2020 parliamentary elections, which were boycotted by a large part of the opposition. The result is a parliament with virtually no opposition. In this manner, the political system lost the ability to hold the government politically accountable for its actions. This further strengthened the trend of concentration of power in the hands of the President of the Republic.
The work of the judiciary and independent bodies has been marked by conflicts with the executive power and a declining ability to control it. Over the past decade, the executive power has repeatedly tried to further limit the independence of the judiciary through constitutional reforms. Due to strong resistance from the professional community, citizens' associations, the opposition and the media, it temporarily gave up. However, it did not give up on invalidating the judiciary. In recent years, the analyses show that the government has actively undermined the authority of the judiciary in public. The relations between the executive power and the independent bodies had a similar trajectory (especially the Protector of Citizens and the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection). The government started by ignoring them and undermining their work, only to end up appointing officials who would lead these institutions in a more cooperative way.
Civil society in Serbia has been an avid critic of the government for years. Citizens' associations and independent media monitor the work of the government and reveal their abuses of power. However, there are conflicting trends in this area. On the one hand, there is depoliticized technocratic activism of traditional NGOs. On the other hand, new associations and movements are emerging that manage to mobilize citizens in defense of human rights and laws through street activism and demonstrations. However, in the absence of political and legal mechanisms of government control, these activities at best lead to isolated, but not systemic, successes.
Equally, pro-democracy actors from civil society should be quicker in adapting to their old role of a "rival" of the state, into which they have unfortunately been pushed again. Seeking help by inertia for activities that would only be effective if the short-termed partner relations with the state managed to last is a strategy that does not work.
Its bureaucratic nature, and the way the government approached it, made citizens perceive accession to the EU as opening and closing of some abstract chapters, and not as a process of reform that enhances their legal, economic, social and any other security. Political representatives should prevent the growing euroscepticism among citizens from further decreasing their commitment to democracy as the best form of government for Serbia.
All domestic and international actors should, therefore, vigilantly monitor and prevent the making and implementation of international political, economic and business arrangements that place the interests of corrosive capital in an impermissibly privileged position, whether through secret agreements, lex specialis, subsidies or other legal and economic shortcuts and subsidies.
The hypersensitivity of the EU, the US and parts of the domestic civil sector to the growing influence and popularity of Russia and China can lead to a "self-fulfilling prophecy". Constant vigilance and responsibility of all political actors is needed to ensure that maintaining good cooperation and friendly relations with countries suffering from democratic deficits does not negatively affect the commitment of political representatives and citizens to democratic values.
In order for the solutions to these issues to be accepted and lasting, they need to be reached through a true internal dialogue of all relevant political and social actors, with informed citizen participation and an atmosphere that does not involve lynching anyone who thinks differently from the government. While international influence on resolving these issues is inevitable, strong local ownership of peace, stability and democracy should be an imperative for all political actors and citizens of Serbia.
The two key areas for intervention are entry and movement through the education system and entry and movement through the labor market. In the field of education, it is necessary to increase the chances of entering the education system for underrepresented groups at all levels (from preschool to higher education) and in all areas (e.g. grammar schools for children from lower grades, universities, and not only higher education institutions). As for the labor market, it is necessary to encourage development of entrepreneurial skills and self-employment of young people from all walks of life. It is also very important to eradicate party employment and nepotism in the public sector. This can be done by increasing the transparency of the employment process and strengthening law application in this area. In this way, the field of attributed privileges for the descendants of the ruling and middle class will be limited.
Changing this perception and restoring confidence in democratic principles requires all those changes that lead to the strengthening of democratic institutions and increased participation in politics. Especially the fight against corruption and political clientelism that lead to the usurpation of public resources by economic and political elites and disproportionate economic inequalities.
Civic activism in Serbia has strengthened somewhat in recent years, but is largely limited to the activities of the middle class. Achieving greater goals requires a broader class coalition, and this requires raising civic awareness among all members of society. Free media, the promotion of democratic values and the strengthening of institutions and political participation are key activities in this area. In this sense, the role of civil society organizations, their choice of goals, target groups and key messages is especially important.
That can be ensured by making amendments to regulations that would introduce mandatory public debates when drafting strategic documents, specifying rules and procedures for organizing public debates and public hearings, and obligating the National Assembly to initiate debates on draft laws submitted by citizens.
All this is strongly supported by tabloids close to the authorities. The authorities either do not react to these threats or are very slow in their reaction. This practice needs to end, by establishing the rule of law and guaranteeing free and independent action of citizens in the civil sphere.
There is a need for more transparent allocation of funds and more precise and clear criteria for their allocation, as well as prevention of abuse of rights and roles intended for civil society by CSOs close to the authorities.
In addition, NGOs are mostly donor-oriented. This means that there is very little connection to citizens and no mutual trust. On the other hand, there are more and more civic initiatives coming from below, but they are mostly of a local character with small capacities and opportunities to address a wider audience (partly due to media control). Educating citizens for democracy, better communication and more direct contact of CSOs with citizens while guaranteeing media freedom are necessary steps towards overcoming this situation. It is necessary to encourage civic activism and the involvement of citizens in the activities of civil society.
In order to depoliticize, the composition of the REM Council should be changed so that the number of state representatives in the Council is less than half. Allowing REM to impose fines on the media would improve its efficiency. REM should be obligated to regularly conduct and publish reports on monitoring of media coverage during the election campaign, as well as to conduct regular annual media market research in order to prevent media concentration.
Transparency of ownership should be ensured by changing the type of data listed in the media registers, enabling inspection control and imposing penalties for inaccurate data. The registers should cover all public payments to the media. It is necessary to regulate more precisely the area of public information and advertising, as well as the area of public procurement of public authorities and all companies in which the state is the majority owner.
The lack of internal pluralism is particularly problematic in the context of the two public media services of Radio Television of Vojvodina and Radio Television of Serbia. REM should be obligated to monitor the state of media pluralism, especially in the pre-election period. The process of project co-financing of media content needs to be improved so that citizens participate in the process of determining topics of public interest, and that the commissions have the necessary expertise and independence.
This includes ending the campaign to appease journalists, effective protection in the event of an attack, and the autonomy and efficiency of the judiciary in processing attacks on journalists. Journalists need to be provided with access to all information of public importance. The introduction of internal mechanisms for establishing and maintaining editorial autonomy should be promoted.
It is also necessary to ensure the effective implementation of the new Strategy for Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence. In addition, it is necessary to adopt new gender equality policies, because the Strategy on Gender Equality expired in 2020, and the evaluation of this strategy showed very moderate achievements only in certain areas.
This is the only way the ground can be set for realizing women’s rights and interest, bearing in mind that women's political participation through basic government mechanisms is not enough for achieving that goal.
This primarily refers to the employment of women by reducing gender segregation and encouraging women to be educated and employed in areas that are more promising, as well as eliminating discrimination in employment and promotion. It is especially important to eliminate property inequalities through consistent application of the law and raising awareness of the importance of fair distribution and inheritance of property. Finally, it is important to redistribute responsibilities in family and household care through legal solutions that would make paternal leave mandatory or non-transferable. Improved systems for preventing and protecting women from gender-based violence, including various forms of violence in partnerships and families, and violence against women performing public function are also a necessity.
A change in the strategy of the government (which would establish and respect the basic rules for enjoying the freedom of peaceful assembly) and the citizens themselves would make a great contribution to improving the situation in this area, which would build solidarity with all those who are denied this freedom.
Also, mechanisms need to be strengthened to empower groups with less cultural, social and economic capital to make greater use of mechanisms put in place for protection of their interests. Finally, at the root of discrimination, especially against Roma and women, are strong cultural patterns. Without their change (and the bearers of that change could be both politicians and businessmen), there will be no change in terms of the prevalence and intensity of discrimination.
As in the case of some political freedoms, different social groups do not cooperate in the protection of rights. For example, because the labor market is dual (meaning that the status of workers in the public sector and some large companies is better than workers in small and medium enterprises (SME), self-employed and workers in the informal sector) cooperation of different groups of workers in the fight for socio-economic rights is lacking. Similarly, workers and farmers fail to work together to protect socio-economic rights. All this indicates that the fight for rights would be more efficient if it went beyond the borders of individual groups.
Creating more equal working conditions (through changes to the rules of procedure of the Assembly, funding mechanisms and media conditions) and political competition (not to be understood solely in the context of the election campaign) is a precondition for establishing a more stable democratic order.
This trend could be reinforced by other incentives such as party financing mechanisms or the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly.
That is why it is important that the political positions of the parties are articulated more clearly, which of course is neither a short-term nor a simple process. It can be encouraged by a larger space for representatives of the public and civil society, more transparent work of the National Assembly (public debates and public hearings), but also by a different attitude of the media towards politicians.
This can be achieved through institutional mechanisms (separation of elections at different levels or the introduction of preferential voting), but also through incentives coming from the media or civil society.
Regular adoption and consistent implementation of the annual work program of the Assembly, stronger role and responsibility of parliamentary committees, as well as timely engagement of parliamentary mechanisms on key current issues of importance to citizens would contribute to strengthening the systemic approach and effective functioning of the parliament.
It would contribute to ensuring substantial consideration of proposed legal solutions and their effects in all segments of society. This would prevent, as far as possible, the adoption of unfavorable, discriminatory or contradictory legal solutions. A more meaningful engagement of MPs and parliamentary committees would contribute to overcoming the widespread image of the Assembly reduced to a mere administrative service of the Government or the President of the Republic (rubber stamp parliament).
In addition, the parliament must ensure proactive cooperation with independent institutions, provide all preconditions for their independent, autonomous and effective functioning. This would be achieved by proactively seeking and using the opinions and findings of independent institutions in its work, and regularly and timely reviewing their reports. Adopting conclusions based on those reports would contribute to the fulfillment of their recommendations and the improvement of the situation in the areas of their competence.
In that sense, the chairman is obligated to prevent and impartially sanction insults, attacks, as well as any other inappropriate behavior of deputies by consistent application of mechanisms provided by the Parliamentary Rules of Procedure and the Code of Conduct of Deputies, in order to urgently stop abuse of the parliament rostrum. The amendment of the Code of Conduct for MPs in accordance with international standards, which were taken into account when drafting this document, would also contribute to this.
The structure of the administration, its instability, and the limited capacity of professional services make it impossible to protect the integrity of elections in practice. Therefore, a professional election administration is needed, independent in its work, permanently committed to strengthening the integrity of the election process.
As a rule, their findings are published after the election day and cannot influence the decision-making of voters. An active role of independent bodies is needed, which would control and sanction the behavior of electoral actors, primarily those who abuse public resources and act from the governmental position.
There are few media critical of the government and they are not in a position to create a balanced image. Professional media should inform voters in a more neutral and analytical way. They need to acquaint the voters not only with party programs, but also with the behavior of actors in the election process, so that they can be held politically accountable in the elections.
The number of voters decreased by one million from the elections held in 2008, to those held in 2020. Changes to the election rules should make it easier for parties to participate in the electoral process, remove all practical restrictions on voting, and remove voters' fears of the consequences of going to the polls.
This implies a change in the law and the Constitution, which would go in the direction of not greater control, but greater independence. At the same time, it is necessary for the executive branch to refrain from invalidating the judiciary in the public sphere.
It is necessary to change the electoral system. The establishment of a more direct relationship between voters and elected representatives, while maintaining the advantages of the existing proportional system, is the optimal solution.
Analyzes show that only by synchronized influence of the political system, judiciary and civil society some progress can be made regarding control of the government and strengthening the rule of law.